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Introduction to Suffering, Endurance, Understanding: New Discourses in Philosophy and
Literature"
The them e of this special issue is one universal to all creatures -suffering. In Latin, sufferere m eans literally, "to bear up" under, to endure, tolerate. This suggests suffering is prim arily a m ental or existential condition as opposed to, say, physical pain, which m ay be of m omentary duration and yielding to m edicinal palliation. There m ay be heuristic and philosophical reasons to separate pain from suffering, at least when dealing in categorization. Jules et Jim captures this rift when the lead character cries: "God spare m e physical pain! I can cope with m oral suffering" (Truffaut) . Elaine Scarry's The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World argues that representations of physical pain in literature are surprisingly rare com pared to num erous depictions of " psychological suffering [which] have referential content" (11). Scarry argues it is im possible to understand another's pain, but she also suggests that suffering does have its own vocabulary and language. Richard Rorty takes up this point in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity through the subject of torture. Besides enacting dam age to the corporeal body, torture renders im potent any attempt to reconstitute the self and thereby m ake oneself whole within language. While Scarry's view that artistic creativity can be realized through suffering is controversial, the idea that suffering can shape a hum an life through language has found a hom e in traum a studies. Other works that com e to m ind that try to theorize suffering within ethical inquiry are Judith Butler's, Precarious Life, Vulnerability and the Ethics of Co-Habitation -which asks whether we (hum ans) are ethically required to respond to suffering that appears far away from us -and, in a different register, the work of Peter Singer, which adopts a utilitarian perspective.
Religion and, to som e extent, philosophy seek m eaning within sufferin g and m ay even find com pensatory virtue -the obvious example being the suffering of Christ on the cross. There are secular versions of this as well, as exem plified by Michael Brady's recent work Suffering and Virtue (2018) . Brady suggests that suffering is unavoidable and therefore he wants to demonstrate its "use," either as a "test of faith" or virtue (Brady 159) . Or as a form of atonem ent (153). According to Brady, "we are creatures that strive and seek to accomplish things of value, and to do so successfully we need to face and overcome difficulty, adversity, setbacks, hardships" (89). 1 Other writers see suffering as (im )posing the im possibility of redemption. Mark Taylor, in an elegant -and elegiacal -passage, demonstrates Maurice Blanchot's dedication to thinking the latter:
Death and dying expose the radical passivity of all finite human beings. To live is to suffer dying; the most profound suffering is undergone not only in terms of distress, illness, or when the end of life draws near, but occurs in every passing moment, in every fleeting instant of life. For Blanchot this suffering is not redemptive… Life is always after death because there is no after life (80).
Given the m any ways exist to think, feel, to m ake sense of suffering, it m ay be profoundly quixotic -and even m isguided -to expect a single issue, even one prim arily focused on literature, to say anything profound, let alone new, about a topic so universally acknowledged and fretted over. Our hope was to give contributors free rein to define suffering any way they wished with one condition: the essays had to speak to, and within, the interlinked discourses of literature and philosophy (or literary theory). Put som ewhat broadly, the goal was to solicit article s that m ake the reader think and feel, ideally in ways that define easy categorization, and without sublating one form of discourse into the other (philosophy collapsing into literature or vice -versa)
Literature has the benefit of being directly connected to people lives and offers a ready -if not always im m ediately accessible -portal into the them e of suffering. Like religion, literature, as a catharsisenabling vehicle able to soothe pain and provide lessons in em pathy, which is one of its trustworthy attractions. This m eans readers m ust interrogate the value of all depictions of suffering itself. At times, aesthetic depictions of suffering -and here I am thinking too of m ore visceral portrayals in photography and film -can cause us to question the ple asure -or at least fascination -we take in such im ages. Literature (and art) ask us to participate (take part in) the work; we are never passive observers. Apropos of photography, Susan Sontag and John Berger have exquisitely delved into this in two pieces: Regarding the Pain of Others (Sontag) and "Photographs of Agony," both discussing the ways that New Discourses Within Philosophy and Literature " CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/1> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson photos of anguish and pain can either activate or, in Berger's view, desensitize us to suffering, in the latter exam ple, victim s of the war in Vietnam .
Conversely, aesthetic representation, in its "virtuous" aspect, has exem plary powers to activate positive em otions, to provoke com passion, fellow-feeling, and -dare I say it? -pathos, even where it m ay be partly clouded by am bivalence. Katie Wetzel's essay in this volum e on Charles Dickens shows how affectionate portrayals of traum a within the fam ily can heighten -and perpetuate --national ideology. But Dickens' affective power to reveal hum an suffering -in the different form s it can take as injustice, insult, and privation --through the lives of Little Nell, Oliver Twist, Pip, and others is unm atched. These renderings are different from, but still connected to someone like, to choose another exam ple, Robert Bresson, the great poet and film maker of suffering. Anyone who has watched his films knows that suffering is the life, breath, and blood of Bresson, overtly and covertly depicted in every fram e. If we could select just one image from this sparse, but overfilled, corpus, the scene in Au Hasard Balthazar of Balthazar the donkey laboring in her paces and ultim ately collapsing m ay be the most poignant.
For Bresson, the donkey Balthazar is a sacrificial victim , and here the question arises of how suffering links up with a larger intended meaning or fram ework. One cannot watch Bresson, and also Pasolini, without questioning the role of Catholicism in their oeuvres. The aesthetic encounter with their work deepens and tragically com plicates any version of the church as dogm a or sim ple devotion.
Such routine -but never routine --encounters with peasants, domestic animals, and children may lead us to question our hum anistic vision of the world. This fundam ental doubt over the value of ideas and values is expressed in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature by Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum speaks of "a conception of ethical understanding that involves em otional as well as intellectual activity and gives a certain type of priority to the perception of particular people and situations" (ix). As readers, we are confronted not with an abstract question to resolve. We are thrust into unique narrative worlds where suffering is part of the texture of lived experience. Nussbaum encourages us to stop compartmentalizing the cognitive and the em otional domains. These are far more intertwined than we may im agine, particularly in regards to what we mean by the simple verb, to know: "one sees here, again, the difficulty of characterizing the debate between the literary works and standard philosophy in any way that will yield a shared account of the goal. Yet I think we m ay have the sense that there is a genuine debate here, the sense that self-knowledge, even if vaguely specified, is a goal with real content and real im portance, capable of organizing further inq uiry" (285). This kind of knowledge does not start with abstract ideas but with a com plex set of facts and m oves outward.
As I type these words, m y thoughts turn to a recent review by Colin Burrow in the London Review of Books on the Rom antic poet, William Wordsworth. The genius and also perplexity of Wordsworth's greatest poetry stems from efforts to weld an expansive philosophic vision -one encouraged steadfastly by his friend Sam uel Coleridge -onto poems that reflected human and natural life. And yet as Burrow rem inds us, Wordsworth was a poet principally of feeling: "a poet [e.g. Wordsworth] points your towards this thing it's possible to feel or to have felt, and you can follow if you're prepared to accept that it's real even though you can't see it" (Burrow 14) . Roe's argum ent is that as Wordsworth m atured, he began to m ove away from earlier form s of abstract justification towards a m ore existential and sym pathetic encounter with nature and hum an beings. In short, "Wordsworth m oved away from the direct poetry of protest … towards what Roe term s the poetry of suffering" (15, m y em phasis).
This does not displace philosophy entirely -and Wordsworth's efforts to attain a "philosophic poem" would drive m uch of his later efforts to shape The Excursion -but the leech gatherer, displaced solider, disposed widow, and other characters who populate the Lyrical Ballads and The Ruined Cottage -sim ply exist. The observer observing the scene (whoever he is) is often forced to suspend any m oral and critical judgm ent in favor of sheer wonderment that is arguably pre -philosophical. To read Wordsworth is both fam iliar and unsettling: the voice of a consciousness processing reality. 2 But it is not to deny philosophy altogether. If anything, that em bedded dialogue between Coleridge and Wordsworth is what constitutes Wordsworth's poetry and renders value. 3 As am bivalent inheritors of the Enlightenment and Kant, the Rom antics sought a new order in m ythology (Blake), pantheism (Shelley), and belief in the prim acy of feeling (Wordsworth). The common New Discourses Within Philosophy and Literature " CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/1> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson view that British Rom antics privileged the supremacy of feeling over cold reason is not without truth. But feeling was itself an object of study within philosophy, m ost im portantly in the works of Adam Sm ith and Edm und Burke. In the 18th-century Adam Sm ith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, based his entire theoretical edifice on the role feelings play in creating virtue through empathy for others. And he tried to show, using conceptual term inology, how feelings arise, even within theatrical spectacles, or dram as, where we know the action on stage is fictitious. The development of sympathy as a concept, and efforts to describe how it operates in the body and is shared by others, is directly correspondent to any theory of suffering, particularly any that would deal with literary and artistic representation. 4 If we m oderns have become today less trustful of art and philosophy to disclose suffering, it is not because we lack exam ples. If anything, we have too m any. We are inundated with im agery, news, and stories that cry out for our attention. And, in turn, this outpouring m ay cause us to doubt the efficacy of the intellect or the m ind to m ake sense of it. Alternatively, we m ay be led to evaluate e very encounter by how easily it translates into political action, next to which "m ere" art and critical aesthetic appraisal can appear indulgent or irresponsible (this problematic is discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4 of Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity) . As critics -who stand betwixt and between the world of the artist and the world of the thinker -how do we m ediate between this locus of feeling and thought? Brief Note on Philosophy / Literature It seems incum bent on m e to say som ething about the last part of the them e title: "new discourses within philosophy and literature." Efforts within literary studies to m ediate philosophy and literature seem rarer these days. Perhaps this is due to the success of literary th eory itself. If everything has become a text, then do we need to continually rethink the divide? if we are living in a dim inished time for the hum anities -when, specifically, philosophy lacks salience -then continuing to interrogate its connection to other disciplines m ay appear to outsider observers like trying to rearrange the proverbial deck chairs on the Titanic." 5
In 1987, when that success was slightly less assured, Arthur Danto wrote that "Philosophy seems so singular a crossbreed of art and scie nce that it is som ewhat surprising that only lately has it seemed im perative to some that philosophy be viewed as literature: surprising and somewhat alarm ing" (Danto 3). Danto was hardly trying to collapse both dom ains or, conversely, articulate clear borders, but to invite readers to reexam ine both the tendencies of analytical philosophy to bracket the literary to privilege its own domain; and, second, by rem apping the outer boundaries of both, reclaim literature as a vehicle of expression within philosophical discourse. 6 That m akes George Steiner's 2011 The Poetry of Thought: From Hellenism to Celan seem som ething like a throwback. Steiner, in his usual capacious m anner, engages the entire corpus of the West within this nexus. Steiner's view is inclusive; he is happy to adm it into the gates a vast parade of poets, dram atists, thinkers, and sages, over the m illennia whose work straddles -or crosses -the divide: from Em pedocles, Sophocles, Plato, Protagoras and the other Sophists, to, m ore recently, Rilke, Holderlin, Nietzsche, Goethe, Heidegger, and Benjam in. This is not to say the historical and conceptual distinctions between philosophy and literature are lost on him . Steiner readily attests that philosophy and literature have their respective histories, stylistic and conceptual and institutional apparatuses, as well as m odes of organizing reality, are entirely disparate. Not com mingling philosophy and literature, but keeping them at arm s -length distance, working within the border regions of the two. Steiner's credo for the book is form ulated early on: "where philosophy and literature m esh, where they are litigious toward one another in form and m atter, these echoes of origin can be heard" (Steiner 13). Jacques Derrida's provocative statement in Margins of Philosophy, that "the task is to consider philosophy also as a 'particular literary genre,'" 7 could be taken to m ean that both discourses resolve them selves into the same thing -it is not so sim ple. But rather than try to parse thes e differences here -there is not space for it, in any event --I would close by suggesting that, in the spirit of Steiner, and New Discourses Within Philosophy and Literature " CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/1> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson others, we should not foreclose discussion by pre -defining. The topic is an im portant one, and there is obviously sufficient interest in both subjects to allow for continued fruitful discussion in these (and future) pages.
The Papers in this Volume
As the above brief comments make clear, qualitatively describing, let alone understanding, the breadth of work on, related to, or about suffering, is an insuperable undertaking, and m ost likely im possible. Just as the ways one m ay encounter suffering -either personally or in an artistic work -are inexhaustible, so are the ways we m ay m ake sense of them. There is hardly a single literary work that does not, in som e form , deal with suffering, or its cousins, anxiety, conflict, or dread. It is the one of the ways we define ourselves as radically and distinctly hum an, as we try to m ake room for other species on this planet.
As one m ight expect from a topic this vast, the articles that m ake up this volum e are extremely varied. Most of the authors took the gambit -or rabbit's foot -of engaging philosophy in the context of literature. Professor Lo focuses on the dism al state of an "anonym ous and m ostly m uted, underprivileged hum an-billboard" in Tsai Ming-Liang's film of the sam e title who wanders the streets o f Taipei lost and m ostly alone (Lo 3). Hivren Dem ay Atay's looks at the author, Peter Handke, facing his m other's suicide. And in the two essays on Han Kang's The Vegetarian, the authors explore how not conforming to the specific demands of a m eat-eating culture can pose suffering of its own as well as extrem e effects. In each essay, the authors were also forced to consider how such personal and lived experiences can enable a specific philosophical viewpoint or idea.
Aleksandra Hajduczek works within the contours of Derrida's work on archives to unpack certain signifying traits in David Park's 2008 novel, The Truth Commissioner. Them es of rem embered and enacted violence, and political control, take place in an im agined universe in a post -apartheid South Korea. Essays by Yulia and Gerald Naughton, Katherine Wetzel, Chao Shun -Liang, Hivren Dem ir, and Kim Won-Chung m ine a rich body of interpretation on an eclectic group of authors, ranging from Nabokov, Dickens, Mary Shelley, the Austrian novelist, Peter Handke, and the Korean writer, Han Kang. The issue rounds out with reflections on clim ate change (Sim on Estok); Syrian refugees (Asaad), and Buddhist philosophy (Justin Hewitson). In Asaad and Estok's work, we see a striving to use theory to com plexify the political debates surrounding clim ate change and m igrants, respectively but also a desire to see if suffering can be used towards a political end ("politics" not confined to any determinate or sim plistic binary opposition with theory). Asaad also suggests h ow the m edium of documentary can be used to subvert the typical, and som ewhat glib, portrayal of refugees as abject subject. And Ji-Ching Hsiung has written a thoughtful study of Em m anuel Levinas and Orwell's 1984 that confronts the im portant issue of embodiment in both writers' works ("Self and Body: A Levinasian Reading of Orwell's 1984). 8 Finally, as the co-editor of this special issue I am particularly grateful to m y fellow co -editors, Simon Estok and Frank Stevenson, for their willingness to stick with this to the end, and to the m any contributors of this special thematic issue. In the end, we m ay be left with a chasm -but a fruitful one. Philosophy can provide a conceptual apparatus and, in som e cases,, possible justifications to why we suffer. But com pared to the affective powers of art, and its portrayal of lived histories, the risk it will become overly abstract or even pollyannish. And yet the result of literature is to cause us to crave enlarged m eaning, a theoretical or ethical fram ework that will at least result in a world we want to live in. It is that challenge posed by the conjunction of philosophy and literature that anim ates our discussion here.
